

• Grow on secure grounds

# Broken by Design

- The need for some better foundation

- Security by Isolation
- Trusted Computing
- Security Processes

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
\*\*mantor unclassified\*\*  
2010-08-10

## Platform/OS Design

# Current State

## Security by Isolation / Security by Correctness – Concept


- Security by Isolation
  - Isolate different environments from each other
- Security by Correctness
  - Perfectly secure code




## Platform/OS Design – Searching for isolation

- Anyone using Ring 1 and Ring 2?
- No! We all love chubby kernels.

### Intent



### Reality



## Platform/OS Design – Searching for isolation

### □ Servers

- Different process / different user / chroot / jail
- But still not by default and still overlook

### □ Desktops

- Admin vs User
- All software we execute run under our authority
- Why do my mp3 player has access to my financial reports?

## Platform/OS Design – searching for isolation


- Firewire / PCMCIA / PCI
  - DMA access
  - What does this mean?
  - Complete memory access
  
- Why does my network card has complete memory access?

## Platform/OS Design

Broken by Design!


## Security by Isolation– Qubes OS

- Virtual Machine Monitor / Hypervisor
  - Virtual Machine
- Qubes OS
  - Disposable VMs
  - NetVM, StorageVM





# Security by Isolation— Qubes-OS



## Trusted Computing – Very brief overview


- Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT)
  - Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
  - Can fix the DMA problem
  
- Protection
  - Software based attack
  - Unsophisticated local hardware attack
  - Protect user's data from outsiders
    - Sealed storage
  - Attestation

## Trusted Computing – Quick Example

- How would we secure a 45\$ Ebay transaction?
- What if we could use a trusted environment to confirm the transactions?
  - Secure code: small and simple to verify
  - Trusted by both parties (Ebay and You)
  - External entities must not be able to interfere


# Trusted Computing – Quick Example

- The architecture




# Trusted Computing – Quick Example

## Validation 1/2



# Trusted Computing – Quick Example

## Validation 2/2



# Security Processes

## Current State

## Security Processes – How?

- Industry Security Standard are audit oriented
  - ISO/NIST/etc don't define how to implement security!
- Security is not implemented as it should
- Almost no metrics
  - Hard to identify our success/failure
  - Hard to get better
  - Hard to justify
  - Inconsistent security measure



## Security Processes – How to evaluate 3<sup>rd</sup> parties?

### Any hesitation?

- External development team
- External business solution
- Cloud computing

## Security Processes


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## Security Processes – Live Security Standard

- Test-Driven Development
- Policy enforcement
- Metrics

## Security Processes


- Vulnerability Scan
- Patch Management
  
- Issue Management
- SDLC Enforcement



## Security Processes – Live Security Standard

### Security Postures

- Capability Maturity Model (CMM)
- Process Coverage
- Domain Coverage
- Automation Level



## Use case – Mantor's dnssec

- DNS -> Domain Name System
  - google.com -> 67.68.33.234
  - Federated
  - Highly Redundant
- DNSSEC
  - DNS + Integrity
  - Can be used to distribute Public keys
    - Servers and Clients Authentication
    - Establish Secure Channels (HTTPS, Emails, etc)
  - Death of PKI/SSL/TLS/PGP ???

The END

*Security by Design*

## Links

- Mantor: [www.mantor.org](http://www.mantor.org)
- Blog: [blog.mantor.org](http://blog.mantor.org)
- OpenSec: [dev.mantor.org/openssec](http://dev.mantor.org/openssec)
- Qubes OS: [www.qubes-os.org](http://www.qubes-os.org)
- Trusted Computing: [www.trustedcomputinggroup.org](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org)
- TrouSerS: [trousers.sourceforge.net](http://trousers.sourceforge.net)
- Bsssd: [bsssd.sourceforge.net](http://bsssd.sourceforge.net)
- Firewire attack: [www.hermann-uwe.de/blog/physical-memory-attacks-via-firewire-dma-part-1-overview-and-mitigation](http://www.hermann-uwe.de/blog/physical-memory-attacks-via-firewire-dma-part-1-overview-and-mitigation)